



This paper sets the stage for a longer study of how the leaders of Japan’s postwar labor unions 
– themselves young radicals during the 1920s and 1930s – sought to harness the young blue-
collar radicals who, alienated from union authorized political struggles of the Old Left,
chose to join in the New Left movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In my earlier
work I argue that during the early decades of the postwar era, public and private institutions
constructed social roles for blue-collar men that augured the reemergence of a common set of
gender practices legitimizing the subordination of women to men and the dominance of some
men over others. The resultant hegemonic masculine ideal for the blue-collar “working man”
was nonetheless ideologically flexible: labor leaders found it useful as a means of mobilizing
union militancy, corporate managers were able to deploy it to quell union militancy, and the
state found it a useful symbol of Japan’s economic success. By the mid-1960s, work had
become the measure of citizenship, employment synonymous with manhood, and Japanese
men the breadwinners of postwar society.
My current research examines the extent to which the socially constructed aspects of gender 
identity influenced the economic and political choices made by two generations of blue-collar 
Japanese, born in the 1920s and 1940s, during the high-growth 1960s. Blue-collar workers 
formed the economic base of Japan’s greatly expanded middle-class all through the 1970s 
and 1980s. Indeed, Japan’s period of high economic growth from the mid-1960s to the late-
1980s brought better wages overall, and even took Japan to the brink of becoming the largest 
economy in the world. That said, higher wages for Japan’s blue-collar workers were not the 
result of the noblesse oblige of corporate managers, but were instead won by nearly two 
decades of intense union militancy that by the early 1960s saw successive years of five to six 
percent wage increases for the majority of Japan’s unionized full-time blue-collar workers. The 
fulcrum of their success was the ability of socialist labor leaders to leverage their influence 
over nearly 6 million workers and coordinate annual pattern-bargaining struggles to pressure 
the majority of private and public sector employers to accede to their wage demands (Gerteis 
2009, 65-91). 
Much to the surprise of the leaders of the dominant socialist labor federation Nihon Sōhyō 
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Gikai (Sōhyō), whose focus on achieving higher worker’s wages was a means to achieving a 
socialist victory in parliament, increasing standards of living for Japan’s blue-collar workers 
led to a significant change in workers’ aspirations. By the mid-1970s the majority of blue-
collar Japanese, young and old, increasingly expressed to union interviewers that they were 
much more interested in achieving material prosperity through car ownership and ski vacation 
than by winning a socialist victory in parliament. Although not terribly surprising to the 
external observer, the shift in focus nevertheless made it increasingly difficult for union leaders 
to garner the support of the rank-and-file. But perhaps more significantly the shift in material 
circumstances and worker mentalité also contributed to a generational schism as younger men 
and women increasingly rejected the hegemonic masculine ‘family man’ and ‘housewife’ 
ideal-type gender identities that the labor movement had made front and center of their 
mobilization campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s (Gerteis 2009). 
By analyzing the ways in which middle-aged male leaders of Japan’s largest labor 
unions perceived politically active, young blue-collar men and women, I aim to show how 
generational conflict influenced the ways in which an increasing number of blue-collar men 
of all ages identified with middle-class cultural and economic forms. One result was the 
fracturing of the Old Left’s monopoly on class-based ideals of masculinity, which set the stage 
for a cascade of class and gender confusions that have shaped popular notions of “work” and 
“manhood” to the present day.
The sometimes violent confrontations between labor and management that characterized 
labor relations during the late 1940s and 1950s contributed to the creation of a postwar wage 
system premised on the notion that a blue-collar man was the sole breadwinner for his family, 
and set the stage for the increased standards of living that accompanied double-digit economic 
growth in the 1960s (Kumazawa 1996, 52; Gordon 1998, 163-168). Developing alongside 
similar wage systems for white-collar workers, the blue-collar age- and seniority-based wage 
system can be seen as one cause for young blue-collar men becoming alienated from their 
predominantly left-led labor union, because it left them lesser paid, despite individual skill and 
ability, and hierarchically subordinate to the older generation of male workers.
The socialist labor movement, which represented the majority of wage-earning men 
and women until the late 1980s, was no stranger to the use of gender norms as a means of 
mobilizing the Japanese working class. Labor propaganda had deployed gendered tropes 
since the early twentieth century, but the material basis for the postwar labor movement’s 
reconstruction of customary gender roles fully emerged in the early 1950s (Gerteis 2007, 
2009, 2014). The Densan Wage System, named for the Electrical Utility Workers’ Union 
(Nihon Denki Sangyō Rōdō Kumiai Rengō Kyōgikai, or Densan), which created it in the late 
1940s,  quickly became the basis upon which the socialist General Council of Trade Unions 
(Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai, or Sōhyō), a national federation of unions representing 
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approximately six million wage earners, assessed target wages for the pattern bargaining 
campaigns that consisted of contract negations between an industry-wide union and one 
employer during which the union focused all its resources on winning a favorable contract 
from that employer and then used the conflict and resultant agreement as a precedent to 
demand similar contracts from additional employers not otherwise bound by the original 
agreement. By the mid-1950s, Densan had won several contracts that assessed worker wages 
based on the real cost of living as calculated by the union, not the government or management 
(Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai 1964, 362-373). 
A radical reconceptualization of the purpose of the workplace itself, the Densan Wage 
System ignored corporate profit (not a particularly pressing issue for a publicly owned utility) 
and privileged need by emphasizing that the purpose of work was to enable a worker to live 
the minimum cultured life guaranteed by Article 25 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan. The 
Densan “market-basket” wage system established base wages based on the actual cost of food 
staples, housing, transportation, and medical care. Created to suit the needs of a majority male 
workforce, it was built on the premise that a male wage earner headed each worker household. 
By adopting the Densan market-basket ideal, Sōhyō promoted the demand for a family-
centered wage for all Sōhyō workers. This resulted in a federation-wide wage system that 
privileged the male breadwinner as the economic goal central to union activism. 
In the mid-1950s, Sōhyō secretary-general Ōta Kaoru institutionalized the market-basket 
system by incorporating its premise that a workers’ wages supported a wife and children at 
home into the way Sōhyō determined the base wage demanded during the annual Spring 
Wage Offensive (Shuntō). The Shuntō were jointly coordinated campaigns in which public 
and private sector unions collaborated in a series of direct actions in support of large-scale 
pattern bargaining for minimum increases in base wages. Both private and public railway 
unions played a central role in the success of the Shuntō because their ability to shut down 
the transportation nexus on command was crucial to Sōhyō’s ability to engage in pattern 
bargaining with public and private officials. The Spring Wage Offensive provided a powerful, 
coordinated structure within which both private and public sector unions could ensure 
incremental wage increases during the high-speed double-digit growth of the 1960s, and it 
consequently dominated the collective bargaining arena until the late 1990s (Kume 1998, 73-
106; Weathers 2008, 177-197). 
With the launch of the first nationally coordinated Shuntō in 1956, the concept of a family 
wage gained hold through the federation’s demand for base wages determined by the needs of 
a male worker’s family implicit in the market-basket wage demanded by Densan in the early 
1950s. At the heart of this system lay the fundamental assumption that women’s wage-earning 
work merely supplemented the income of the male wage earner who presumably headed the 
Japanese household. What motivated workers belonging to Sōhyō-affiliated unions to join 
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strikes coordinated by Sōhyō, even when their own unions had already reached a settlement 
with management, was the dream of a base wage that allowed a working man to support his 
family (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai 1964, 362-373; Tōkyō Chihō Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai 
1980, 491-511).
All through the 1950s and 1960s, nationally coordinated strike actions won contracts 
granting aggregate base-percentage increases in workers’ wages worked which resulted 
in aggregate hourly wages nearly doubling for all wage earners between 1955 and 1965. 
However, wage gains were not distributed equally. Women certainly bore the worst of this 
burden in the form of lower wages overall, but the wage gap between male blue-collar workers 
aged 20–24 and 30–34 also widened to 38 percent (Ōmachi 1964, 65-73; Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 
1975, 398-99). Later, the wage gap between male workers aged 20–24 and 30–34 narrowed 
to 34 percent from 1965 to 1975, while the wage gap for the cohort of men who were 30–34 
years in 1975 (and in their early twenties in 1965) and men of the age cohort ten years older 
(40–44 years) also narrowed slightly to 12 percent, indicating a general flattening of age-based 
wage disparities that appeared to bode well for the wage-earning prospects of blue-collar men 
belonging to younger age cohorts. Although younger men still made two-thirds of that earned 
by older male co-workers, the difference was not as great as it had been just ten years previous. 
Indeed, men aged 20-24 holding manufacturing jobs earned 68 percent of the wages earned by 
men aged 30-34, while transportation and communication sector workers earned 71 percent. 
Male utility workers aged 20-24 earned 64 percent, and male service sector workers, which 
included government employees and teachers, 65 percent. (Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 1975,70-75, 
398-99). 
Blue-collar men were doing well, and union leaders heavily invested in schemes promoting 
social roles for blue-collar men that defined manliness in terms of work and wages as a means 
encouraging a distinct political agenda. Social expectations that a “real man” worked for his 
family increasingly became the norm. Yet many young men had reported to union officials a 
decade earlier their dismay that even by the age of thirty they did not make enough to marry, 
a predicament that threatened to become a self-perpetuating cycle—a man could not make 
enough to get married, but he would not be paid a high wage until he married (Gerteis 2009, 
129-130). Indeed, in addition to a wife, higher wages would also allow the acquisition of a 
host of consumer products recently arrived on the national scene, and in the minds of many 
blue-collar men the achievement of manhood had become tantamount to joining the middle 
class. Despite the narrowing of wage disparities between younger and older men, the rhetorical 
and material reality appear to have combined to create a wage and status hierarchy that 
subordinated male blue-collar youth.
Union economist Ōmachi Keisuke thought that there was trouble brewing for the near 
future. Writing for the labor magazine Monthly Sōhyō (Gekkan Sōhyō) in 1964, Ōmachi 
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observed that the wage disparity between men in their twenties and men in their thirties 
(young and middle-aged) played a significant role in the “graying” of the labor movement. The 
majority of workers in the rapidly growing communications, transportation, and service sectors 
were aged twenty-five to thirty, but the average age of union members in those same sectors 
would soon reach thirty-five. Ōmachi argued that although workers under the age of thirty 
comprised more than half of the workforce, the rapid economic growth experienced during the 
preceding decade had facilitated a significant wage disparity between young and middle-aged 
men that was far worse in Japan than in Western Europe or the United States. Ōmachi warned 
of dire consequences for Sōhyō if the trend went unaddressed for much longer (Ōmachi 1964, 
65-73).
Ōmachi’s article pinpointed a problem that Sōhyō leaders preferred to ignore. Sōhyō unions 
had won contracts that secured better wages and faster promotion tracking for men in exchange 
for management schemes that, regardless of skill or ability, systemically relegated women and 
young men to the lower-paying base of the workforce. Sōhyō unions had agreed to contracts 
paying younger men and women less as a means of defraying the cost of higher wages for 
middle-aged men. Young workers, both males and females under the age of thirty, comprised 
a significantly larger percentage of the waged workforce than unions had on their membership 
rolls. While the low rates of unionization among young workers resulted from a variety of 
causes, Ōmachi argued that the significant part of the problem lay with the wage disparity 
between younger and middle-aged men that underpinned the family wage model advocated by 
Sōhyō since the mid-1950s.
While union leaders did not at first agree with Ōmachi’s assessment that the “graying” of 
union membership was an economic problem, the Sōhyō Youth Department nonetheless began 
to call for improved wages for younger workers, which seemed to result in a slight narrowing 
of the wage differential between younger and older men. That the average age of Sōhyō 
members continued to rise (reaching thirty-three in 1970) suggests that despite a narrowed pay 
differential, Sōhyō unions continued to have a difficult time recruiting young members. Wage 
and union membership data offer only a glimpse of the economic basis of worker mentality, 
but it seems likely that the declining numbers of young blue-collar union members was in part 
the result of an emerging generational rift between blue-collar men. 
References
Gerteis, Christopher 2007. “The Erotic and the Vulgar: Visual Culture and Organized Labor’s Critique 
of U.S. Hegemony in Occupied Japan.” Critical Asian Studies 39 (1): 3-34.
Gerteis, Christopher. 2009. Gender Struggles: Wage-Earning Women and Male-Dominant Unions in 
Postwar Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
Gordon, Andrew. 1998. The Wages of Affluence:	Labor and	Management	in	Postwar	Japan. Cambridge, 
10
Christopher Gerteis
Nexus of Gender, Class and Generation
112 Christopher GERTEIS 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Kumazawa, Makoto. 1996. Portraits of the Japanese Workplace: Labor Movements, Workers, and 
Managers. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kume, Ikuo. 1998. Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai. 1949–. Nihon	tōkei	nenkan	(Japan statistical yearbook). Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai. 
Ōmachi, Keisuke. 1964. “Seinen wo gisei to shite keizai ha seichō shita—kōdoseichō to teichingin.” 
Gekkan	Sōhyō	3: 65–73.
Tōkyō Chihō Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai. 1980. Sengo	Tōkyō	rōdō	undō	shi:	Tōkyō	chihyō nijūgonen. Rōdō 
Junpōsha.
Weathers, Charles. 2008. “Shunto and the Shackles of Competitiveness.” Labor History 49 (2): 177–97.
